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But we don’t call it ‘torture’! Norm contestation during the US ‘War on Terror’ 
 
Abstract 
International law has become the reference frame that establishes legitimacy for 
international encounters, but paradoxically and at the same time international law 
itself has become increasingly contested. This paper analyses the relationship 
between norm acceptance and norm implementation and examines an instance of 
norm contestation in the context of the US ‘war on terror’. The focus is on the use of 
torture or ‘enhanced interrogation methods’ during the Bush Presidency. The so-
called ‘torture memos’ that were made public in recent years shed light on different 
arguments that were used by the government at the time to justify their actions and 
to show that they were in line with existing international legal obligations. The paper 
seeks to assess the validity of international agreements by analysing compliance and 
actual meaning (‘meaning-in-use’) of fundamental international human rights norms 
that are being contested through different interpretations and usages on the 
domestic level. 
Keywords 
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The paper analyses a central puzzle that exists in two opposing yet concurrent 
developments: more and more international human rights laws and standards are 
negotiated and agreed upon between states but at the same time, such obligations 
are circumvented when they are perceived to impact on national interests 
(especially with regard to national security). It examines the relationship between 
norm acceptance and implementation (i.e. human rights as agreed upon and 
codified in international law) and norm compliance by looking at the contested 
interpretations of established standards. As Wiener and Puetter (2009, p. 3) rightly 
argue, international law is increasingly used as a reference frame for the legality of 
policy decisions, but paradoxically and at the same time, it is international law itself 
that is increasingly contested. 
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The focus of this paper is on the use of torture or ‘enhanced interrogation methods’ 
in the context of the US ‘war on terror’. The so-called ‘torture memos’ that were 
issued during the Bush presidency show different arguments that were made by the 
government to justify their conduct and to demonstrate that these actions were in 
line with existing international legal obligations. The paper employs Wiener’s 
approach of analysing the ‘meaning-in-use’ of the prohibition of torture as an 
international human rights norm by examining compliance and how the norm is 
being contested through different interpretations and usages on the domestic level. 
At the same time, the paper also utilises Brunnee and Toope’s similar approach of an 
interactional account of international law that focusses on the practice of existing 
legal norms. The overall argument of the paper is that rather than simply ignoring its 
international legal obligation, the Bush Administration went to great lengths to 
justify its conduct within existing international law, attempting to make their 
conduct appear to comply with legal obligations. As Alvarez rightly argues, officials 
did not ignore law but they systematically misinterpreted and ‘tortured’ it “so that 
everyone can feel clean.” (Alvarez, 2005-2006, p. 178) The memos attempted to 
twist international law and misconstrued various treaty obligations to make policies 
‘fit’. By referring to already embedded international legal standards, the 
administration thereby shaped and also clarified the shared understanding of the 
anti-torture norm. 
 
The paper starts with a brief outline of the argument’s main analytical framework 
that is used to evaluate developments of the anti-torture norm before looking at 
different memos that were written by members of the Bush administration offering 
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legal advice on interrogation methods. The paper will also evaluate resistance to 
these memos on the domestic and international level as well as the 2014 Torture 
Report. It closes with a brief assessment what the torture memos as well as 
opposition to them mean for the anti-torture norm and whether they led to 
normative changes taking place. The paper looks at norm contestation and norm 
resistance and argues that rather than weakening the absolute prohibition of 
torture, the ‘torture memos’ clarified and thereby arguably strengthened the norm 
in the longer term.  
 
Norms and International Law 
The starting point of this present analysis is the idea that the rule of law as well as 
human rights norms exist and that they can be enforced globally. International law is 
‘the collection of rules and norms that states and other actors feel an obligation to 
obey in their mutual relations and commonly do obey. (…) Rules are formal, often 
written, expectations for behavior, while norms are less formal customary 
expectations about appropriate behavior that are frequently unwritten.’ (Henderson, 
2010, p. 5) A number of norms are institutionalised on a global level through 
international legal provisions, but their actual implementation on the national level 
is always dependent on interpretation and cultural contexts. Brunnee and Toope 
(2010) in their highly influential approach of an ‘interactional account’ of 
international law argue that legal obligation is created through three elements: 
shared understanding, criteria of legality and also a practice of legality. They suggest 
that practice plays a central role in international law that has so far not been taken 
into account enough by IR scholars. They therefore “invite IR scholars to focus their 
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analysis of international law’s impact on the role of practices of legality, rather than 
relying on purely formal indicators of law.” (Brunnée & Toope, 2011, p. 316)  
 
This paper focusses on the final aspect - that of practice - to determine the position 
of the absolute prohibition of torture in the international community in the context 
of the US ‘war on terror’ in particular. Looking at the practice of legal norms works 
well with Wiener’s (2008) terminology of examining the ‘meaning-in-use’ of 
particular norms, i.e. the way norms are being interpreted and applied in particular 
situations. Such ‘cultural validation’ of applying international law in domestic specific 
contexts leads to increased shared understanding that in turn shapes law. Questions 
of norm implementation and contestation are particularly pertinent in the area of 
human rights because agreements on different human rights standards exist (i.e. a 
shared understanding) and they are increasingly incorporated in international law 
(i.e. they satisfy criteria of legality), but their consistent enforcement does not 
necessarily follow (i.e. the practice of legality).  
 
International legal obligations are at times challenged when they are perceived to 
impact on important national interests, such as national security considerations. The 
question that arises is why states aim to legitimise their conduct with reference to 
international law rather than ignoring it entirely. This is a challenge to a 
predominantly realist view of international law that tends to argue that states only 
ever act out of self-interest and choose to ignore international law if it conflicts with 
national values.1  
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The ‘War on Terror’ is an important example to illustrate this complex relationship 
between norm acceptance and norm implementation. The controversies over the 
alleged use of torture by the US administration during the ‘War on Terror’ and its 
justifications in the ‘torture memos’ are an important instance of norm contestation. 
The torture memos are particularly insightful, ‘because norms by definition embody 
a quality of "oughtness" and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications 
for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can 
study’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892) 
 
During the ‘War on Terror’, a number of policy decisions with regard to detainees 
and interrogation methods were justified with reference to existing international 
law. The Bush administration’s interpretation of those laws and obligations arising 
from them, however, were challenged by various actors (even within the 
Administration itself) that advanced a different understanding of the meaning and 
content of these particular norms. The content and actual meaning (‘meaning-in-
use’) of the anti-torture norm as a legal rule was being contested through different 
interpretations and usages on the domestic level. The key question is whether the 
agreed upon human rights standards that have come under attack by the Bush 
administration’s policy decisions are resilient enough to withstand such challenges.  
 
The Torture Convention and relevant case law – formal validity and legality 
In line with Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle model, the prohibition of torture 
can be said to have reached the third and final phase of ‘norm internalisation’. The 
cycle consists of three stages: it starts with the emergence of a new norm, followed 
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by its diffusion and cascade towards greater acceptance, and completes with the 
internalisation of a new norm as a fully incorporated rule. Full norm internalisation 
means that ‘norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of 
broad public debate.’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895)  
 
The prohibition of torture is a norm that is established and institutionalised in the 
international community in a number of ways. The right not to be tortured is 
integrated into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Article 7 sets out that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ Furthermore, the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) is ratified by 
147 states (including the US) and provides binding treaty law.  
 
The prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm which means that it allows no 
exceptions or deviation from it through any other international law. Article 2 of the 
CAT clearly states: that ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.’ There is also a great body of relevant 
case law that further confirms the status of the anti-torture norm. For instance, in 
the Pinochet III decision in 1999, the House of Lords ruled that torture was an 
offence with jus cogens character.2  
 
Even though treaty and case law seem to be clear, to determine the role this norm 
plays in international politics it is necessary to establish how the norm’s actual 
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meaning (i.e. its definition/rule etc.) is enacted in relations between states. This 
means that while the norm ‘abstention from torture’ might be agreed upon in 
international law ‘the actual meaning of this norm may differ in the actual contexts 
of norm implementation.’ (Wiener, 2009, p. 177) The events of 9/11 and the 
subsequent ‘War on Terror’ provided the US government with a framework in which 
it could justify its conduct based on the emergency exception. It is an instance of 
norm contestation that is instructive because as Wiener rightly argues: “the 
challenge for research on compliance with norms consists of how to assess 
contestation as both a conflictive process and hence a potential problem, on the one 
hand, and as a possibility to enhance social recognition and ultimately the legitimacy 
of an international agreement, on the other. Both aspects come to the fore once 
norms are contested.” (Wiener, 2008, p. 39) 
 
Human Rights and the Emergency exception 
The US government argued that 9/11 meant that an unprecedented crisis situation 
had arisen that justified the suspension of some very fundamental human rights. 
This is in line with Carl Schmitt’s understanding of exceptionalism, ‘the exception is 
that domain within jurisprudence in which decision-making “cannot be subsumed” 
by existing norms.’ (Johns, 2005, p. 619) The Bush administration, for instance, 
suspended the Geneva Conventions for prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, arguing 
that the ‘War on Terror’ constituted a new kind of war that required novel 
mechanisms including new interrogation techniques. Alberto Gonzales, in a draft 
memo to Bush set out in January 2002 that ‘in my judgment, this new paradigm, 
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renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and 
renders quaint some of its provisions.’ (Gonzales, 2002)  
 
The Bush administration argued that this extraordinary situation made the use of 
enhanced interrogation methods (EIT) - that were considered by some of the agents 
involved as ‘borderline torture’ (Statement of FBI Agent Ali Soufan at Torture 
Hearing, 2009) - necessary for reasons of self-defence and to protect national 
security. The government fell back on a familiar ‘lesser evil’ argument that is often 
invoked by states fighting terrorism. It is based on the reasoning that a lesser evil of 
suspending some human rights might be necessary to defeat the greater evil of 
terrorism. A choice needs to be made between ‘two evils’ in order to be able to 
defend national security. ‘In the constructed dilemma of weighing the rights of one 
group against the rights of the other group, the answer is obvious [omitted FN]: the 
identifiable norm hierarchy is based on the norm of state security and the belief that 
the ‘terrorists’ do not have the right to full human rights protection.’ (Liese, 2009, p. 
42) 
 
Human rights in international law, however, do set limits to the way 
counterterrorism actions can be conducted. National security considerations might 
be used to justify compromising human rights, but this is problematic as some 
human rights (especially those considered to be fundamental ones) are based on the 
idea that they are universal. They are afforded to individuals because they are 
human beings and they are therefore independent of context, time and space. As 
Ignatieff rightly argues: ‘the abridgements of the rights of a few are easy to justify 
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politically when the threat of terrorism appears to endanger the majority. Rights 
exist, however, to set limits to what fearful majorities can do.’ (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 
1139) 
 
An even stronger, legal argument (as opposed to a predominately moral one) against 
the setting aside of particular human rights is that some rights are absolute and have 
the status of non-derogable rights. As argued above, this includes the prohibition of 
torture which is a peremptory norm that clearly stipulates that there can be no 
exceptions to that prohibition. The fact that torture has such a firm status in 
international law was one of the main reasons why the US attempted to reinterpret 
what ‘torture’ actually meant and that a deviation from a very narrow reading of the 
CAT was justified under the unique circumstances presented by the ‘War on Terror’.   
 
The US government did not openly challenge the absolute prohibition of torture per 
se - rather the opposite. In his statement on the U.N. International Day in Support of 
Victims of Torture in June 2004, President Bush, for instance, claimed that  
The United States will continue to take seriously the need to question 
terrorists who have information that can save lives. But we will not 
compromise the rule of law or the values and principles that make us strong. 
Torture is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United States will 
continue to lead the fight to eliminate it everywhere. (Bush, 2004, p. 1168)  
 
The US government also continued to emphasise the importance of upholding liberal 
values and freedom in the ‘War on Terror’ as well as the assertion that it had always 
been a pioneer and defender of human rights. Such statements are of course partly 
window-dressing on part of the presidency, paying lip service to established human 
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rights standards. The challenge to the absolute prohibition of torture was more 
subtle and focussed on different justification and interpretations of the actions in 
question rather than contesting the overall validity of the CAT and the anti-torture 
norm as an accepted international legal provision. In short, the Bush Administration 
contested and challenged the content, practice and meaning-in-use of torture as an 
established human rights norm – not the validity of the norm itself.  
 
The US government sought to change the meaning of the anti-torture norm through 
redefining what torture actually means, but - as will be argued later - this change 
was not accepted by the international community and also a number of different 
actors within the US government. The Bush administration sought to justify its 
actions with reference to international law, but in line with Cohen’s classification of 
different forms of denials, the argumentation shifted along a continuum of: ‘literal 
denial (nothing happened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something 
else); and implicatory denial (what happened is justified).’ (Cohen, 1996, p. 522) 
 
Once the US administration could no longer literally deny (due to increasing 
evidence to the contrary) that torture did not happen systematically and was 
committed by only a few ‘bad apples’, it moved to a form of interpretive denial. 
Interpretive denial includes the use of euphemisms, such as ‘enhanced 
interrogations’, ‘increased pressure phase’ rather than torture; actions that the 
government saw justified and as being in line with the Torture Convention as well as 
other legal mechanisms that set out the anti-torture norm. (Cohen, 1996, p. 22) 
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Mounting criticisms of this approach, however, forced the administration to move to 
the final form of implicatory denial, arguing that its actions had been justified due to 
‘necessity’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances presented by the challenges of the ‘war on 
terror’. The main issue here lies in the politicisation of what ‘exception’ means rather 
than the exception itself. 
 
The ‘Torture memos’ - Defining torture3 
The first and most controversial in a series of memos was written on 1 August 2002 
by Jay Bybee in response to a request by Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 
to prepare a legal opinion on interrogation standards as implemented by US. The 
Bybee memo sought to redefine torture to only include the most extreme acts:  
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount 
to torture under Section 2340, it must result in significant psychological harm 
or significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years. … We conclude 
that the statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme 
acts. (Bybee, 2002a, p. 1) 
 
The main focus of the interpretation was on the words ‘severe’ and ‘intentional’ 
which were redefined in the memo. In order to constitute torture, Bybee argued, the 
pain must rise to such a level of severity ‘that would ordinarily be associated with a 
sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or 
serious impairment of body functions.’ (Bybee, 2002a, p. 6) In terms of psychological 
suffering, acts ‘must cause long-term mental harm.’ (Bybee, 2002a, p. 13) This 
interpretation went further than what is generally accepted by more conventional 
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readings of the CAT and allowed for more extreme measures (such as 
waterboarding) to fall into the ‘not-torture’ category.  
 
Jay Bybee sent a second memo (Bybee II) which was addressed to John Rizzo (then 
Acting General Counsel of the CIA) to give advice on the permissibility of specific 
interrogation methods of al Qaeda suspects. In this memo, different interrogation 
techniques were examined in great detail to determine whether they would fall 
within international law. Bybee wrote that the CIA wished to ‘move the interrogation 
into what you have described as an ‘increased pressure phase’’ (Bybee, 2002b, p. 1) 
and concluded that none of the proposed methods could be considered to constitute 
torture or a violation of Section 2340A. Discussing the use of the waterboard, for 
instance, Bybee argued that even though it constituted a threat of imminent death 
(which would be in line with his own definition of torture): ‘In the absence of 
prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been 
inflicted, and the use of these procedures would not constitute torture within the 
meaning of the statute.’ (Bybee, 2002b, p. 15) Similar to the first memo, this second 
memo relied heavily on international law and attempted to justify interrogation 
methods under it. There was also the reaffirmation what ‘torture’ meant in the 
context of the policy in question.  
 
Both memos demonstrate a clear attempt to justify certain actions with reference to 
international law. They frequently refer to the Torture Convention and international 
law that the US signed up to. Bybee did not question the formal validity of the anti-
torture norm or the fact that the US had legal obligations under the CAT, the 
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challenge was much rather on the interpretation of what torture actually means and 
how it can be defined. The practice and meaning-in-use of the norm were challenged 
to justify US policy decisions and actions with regard to interrogation methods.  
 
Both memos did not attempt to openly challenge established international norms 
and provisions that prohibit torture, but interpretively denied torture was happening 
by advancing different interpretations of the existing framework. By changing the 
interpretation of what ‘torture’ entailed, the government could claim that it did not 
fall afoul of established standards. The anti-torture norm itself was seen by the US 
government as an established element in international law and an attempt was 
made to use existing legislation to justify the administration’s actions and own policy 
goals.  
 
This approach is not without its critics, however. Harold Koh, Dean of Yale Law 
School and prominent international lawyer, for instance, describes the memo as 
‘perhaps the most clearly legally erroneous opinion I have ever read.’ ("Civil liberties: 
Just a few bad apples?," 2005) Similarly, Waldron argues that the memo’s provision 
‘amounts to a comprehensive assault on our traditional understanding of the whole 
legal regime relating to torture.’ (Waldron, 2005, p. 1709) 
 
The ‘Torture memos’ - Presidential powers 
In addition to redefining torture, the first memo also reaffirmed the very broad 
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief: 
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Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate Section 2340A, the 
statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the 
President’s constitutional power to conduct a military campaign. As 
Commander-in-Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to order 
interrogations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information 
concerning the military plans of the enemy. (Bybee, 2002a, p. 31)  
 
The memo stated that ‘in wartime it is for the President alone to decide what 
methods to use to best prevail against the enemy.’ (Bybee, 2002a, p. 38) Bybee 
argued that necessity and self-defence could be used as possible defences to justify 
certain interrogation methods that fall outside international law to gain information 
necessary to eliminate threats to the US.  
 
Similarly, on 14 March 2003 John Yoo wrote a memo in which he argued that the US 
was not bound by customary international law and that the President could suspend 
it if he felt the necessity to do so. He further argued that the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief powers were absolute and trumped international law:  
it is important to emphasize that the President can suspend or terminate any 
treaty or provision of a treaty. (…) Any presidential decision to order 
interrogation methods that are inconsistent with CAT would amount to a 
suspension or termination of those treaty provisions. (Yoo, 2003, p. 47).  
 
These memos that gave the President absolute powers ignored ongoing 
constitutional debates about what powers the President has or has not got in 
wartime.4 The arguments much rather aimed to demonstrate that the US President 
could choose to be bound by international law and that he could opt out of it if he 
deemed it necessary. 5 This is a case of clear norm contestation as the CAT sets out in 
Art. 2.2 that ‘no exceptional circumstances can be invoked as a justification for 
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torture’. Yoo could embark on this line of argument, however, because the article is 
not incorporated in section 2340 i.e. into US domestic law related to torture:  
Given that Congress omitted CAT’s effort to bar a necessity or wartime 
defense, we read section 2340 and the federal criminal statutes applicable to 
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction as permitting the defense [of 
necessity and self-defence]. (Yoo, 2003, p. 76)  
 
Change of Direction 
The first Bybee memo was leaked to the Washington Post in December 2004 with 
the others becoming public shortly after. The widespread media coverage and public 
outcry that followed, forced the Administration to (at least to be seen to) distance 
itself from the Bybee and Yoo memos. 
 
The so-called Levin memo was issued in 2004 shortly after the press leak in an 
attempt of damage control. In this memo, Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department, argued that 
‘Torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international law.’ 
(Levin, 2004, p. 1) He wrote that  
This memorandum supersedes the August 2002 memorandum in its entirety. 
Because the discussion in the memorandum concerning the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief power and the potential defenses to liability was – and 
remains - unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows. 
Considerations of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent 
with the President’s unequivocal directive that United States personnel not 
engage in torture. (Levin, 2004, p. 2)  
 
Furthermore, the Levin memo made clear that ‘national security’ was not a valid 
excuse and that torture was always unlawful. He reaffirmed that the definition of 
torture that the US adhered to was in line with CAT and not the way it had been 
 16 
defined in the Bybee memo. Crucially, however, the memo did not withdraw the 
view that the President had unchecked powers as Commander-in-Chief and it also 
did not restrict any of the specific techniques authorised in Bybee II which included 
water boarding.  
 
John Yoo continued to insist that Presidential power could not be constrained by 
treaty even after the controversy became public. He argued that the President could 
override CAT in case he was acting in defence of the nation. In an interview with the 
New Yorker in 2005, he argued that ‘Congress doesn’t have the power to tie the 
President’s hands in regard to torture as an interrogation technique.’ And further: 
‘it’s the core of the Commander-in-Chief function. They can’t prevent the President 
from ordering torture.’ (Mayer, 2005) This is a very controversial line of argument as 
Congress certainly believes it has powers to control the President. During a 
Congressional debate, for instance, a number of members of Congress expressed 
their opposition to the assertion that the President had unchecked powers during 
war time. Senator Kennedy for instance argued:  
The President is not an emperor or a king. His administration is not above the 
law or accountability, and he is certainly not infallible. The single greatest 
criticism of this administration’s detention and interrogation policies is that it 
failed to respect history, the collective wisdom of our career military and 
State Department officials, and that it holds far too expansive a view of 
executive authority. In short, the White House suffers from the arrogance of 
thinking they knew best and abandoning the long-standing rules. 




After the Torture Memos became public, more and more dissenting voices even 
from within the Republican Party and the Bush Administration itself came to the 
fore. 
 
On 5 October 2005, Senator John McCain proposed an amendment to the 2006 
Defense Appropriations Bill to ban the U.S. military from using torture. The 
legislation, which became the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) includes more humane 
standards for the treatment of prisoners in the ‘war on terror’ by setting out uniform 
standards for the interrogation of persons under the detention of the Department of 
Defense. Among other things, it contains provisions that require military personnel 
to employ US Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and 
prohibits the ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons 
under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government.’ The DTA 
specifically refers to international legal obligations such as the Torture Convention as 
ratified into US national law and defines cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as 
defined in the CAT. 
 
McCain argued that the recent memos were confusing for soldiers on the battlefield 
and that it should not be expected from them to make their own judgements as to 
what conduct was permissible and what wasn’t. He argued for more clarity in the 
guidelines, closing any legal loopholes: 
I can understand why some administration lawyers might have wanted 
ambiguity so that every hypothetical option is theoretically open, even those 
the President has said he does not want to exercise. But war doesn’t occur in 
theory, and our troops are not served by ambiguity. (Congressional Record: 
October 5, 2005, p. S11062)  
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He further argued that prisoner abuse harmed (rather than helped) US efforts in the 
‘war on terror’, because it led to bad intelligence and it also threatened the safety of 
US troops captured by the enemy. McCain criticised the administration for applying 
the CAT narrowly excluding foreigners held outside US territory, arguing that ‘what 
all this means is that America is the only country in the world that asserts a legal 
right to engage in cruel and inhuman treatment.’ (Congressional Record: October 5, 
2005, p. S11063)  
 
A number of other senators similarly urged Congress to take action to clarify 
interrogation guidelines, arguing that it was important for the US to continue in its 
role as moral leader and not be tempted to abandon its own values including its 
respect for human rights. A during the debate much cited letter by Captain Fishback, 
Major at the US Army, questioned: “Some argue that since our actions are not as 
horrifying as Al-Qaeda’s, we should not be concerned. When did Al Qaeda become 
any type of standard by which we measure the morality if the United States?” 
(Congressional Record: October 5, 2005, p. S11076) 
 
Similar to the arguments employed in the torture memos, Congress also drew upon 
existing international norms in its reasoning, but it did so with vastly different 
interpretations and outcomes. This demonstrates that the anti-torture norm has 
been internalised in international law but it also shows the norm’s contested 
meaning-in-use and difficulties attached to its practice in international politics. 
International law is used as a reference frame to justify policies and arguments from 
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both sides even though Congress’ interpretation of existing provisions is more in line 
with international consensus. A number of members of Congress emphasised this 
need to stay within the existing normative and legal framework and adhere to 
international human rights laws accepted by the US. For instance, Senator Graham 
(R) stated that  
The Bybee memo was an effort by people at the Justice Department to take 
international torture statutes that we had ratified and been party of and have 
the most bizarre interpretation basically where anything goes. It was an 
effort on the part of the Department of Justice lawyers to stretch the law to 
the point the law meant nothing. (Congressional Record: October 5, 2005) 
 
Such references to international law and obligations towards the international 
community show a clear recognition of normative constraints on purely interest-
based policy making that are imposed by the existing framework. 
 
The DTA was eventually passed with an overwhelming majority of 90-9. However, 
even though the DTA was purportedly designed to protect detainees from abuse by 
providing uniform standards for interrogation, in his signing statement, Bush 
awarded considerable discretionary powers to the President:  
the executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to 
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the 
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in 
Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power. 
(Bush, 2005) 
 
This statement reinstalled the earlier provision of the Authorisation of Military Force 
(AUMF) which gives the President unrestricted powers to exercise his authority in 
times of war to protect national security. The President reasserted his powers to 
supersede existing legal obligations to focus on national security based calculations, 
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even though the DTA emphasises the need to stay in line with existing norms. He 
attempted to continue to undermine the anti-torture norm despite opposition even 
from within his own party.  
 
Domestic and international resistance to the normative challenge  
In February 2006, Philip Zelikow, Counsellor to Secretary of State Condolezza Rice 
wrote a critical memo about the administration’s approach towards torture. He was 
clear that even though he was in no bureaucratic position to offer advice, he felt 
strongly about putting forward an alternative view to the OLC memos demonstrating 
that not all lawyers would agree with the Bybee and Yoo approach. The White House 
attempted to collect and destroy all copies of the memo, (Zelikow, 2009) but it 
survived and was made public in April 2012.  
 
In this memo, Zelikow argued that  
almost all of the techniques in question here would be deemed wanton and 
unnecessary and would immediately fail to pass muster unless there was a 
strong state interest to use them. (…) Under American law, there is no 
precedent for excusing treatment that is intrinsically ‘cruel’ even if the state 
asserts a compelling need to use it. (Zelikow, 2006, p. 4) 
 
In his memo, he looked at different occasions of wartimes within US history and 
argued that there were no precedents in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War or any other conflict in which similar interrogation methods had been 
authorised – even if prisoners were deemed to be unlawful combatants. He 
concluded that ‘several of the techniques, singly or in combination, should be 
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considered ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’ within the 
meaning of Article 16’ (Zelikow, 2006, p. 6) of the CAT. 
 
This memo clearly shows that the Bush administration faced some opposition even 
within its own party to its interpretation of existing international legal obligations. 
The fact that Zelikow was ordered to destroy all copies of his memo is telling as well. 
It shows that the Bush administration was aware of the very thin legal ice it was 
treading on and did not want to be openly challenged about it by admitting that it 
had been given conflicting legal opinions at the time.  
 
Resistance to the challenge to the meaning-in-use of the anti-torture norm also 
came from the international community. A number of statements and court 
decisions show that the international community did not agree with the US’s 
attempts to single-handedly change the meaning of the anti-torture norm. For 
instance, in 2005 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, issued 
a statement in which she acknowledged that the ‘War on Terror’ challenged human 
rights standards, but that ‘an illegal interrogation technique, however, remains 
illegal whatever new description a government might wish to give it.’ She further 
argued that the rule of law is important in such times as ‘the law provides the proper 
balancing between the legitimate security interests of the State with the individual’s 
own legitimate interests in liberty and personal security.’ (Arbour, 2005) 
 
In addition the ICTY held in 2007 that  
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even if the U.S. executive branch determined that, for an act causing physical 
pain or suffering to amount to torture, it must “inflict pain … equivalent in 
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death”, this would not suffice 
to make pain of such intensity a requirement for conviction under customary 
international law. No matter how powerful or influential a country is, its 
practice does not automatically become customary international law. (ICTY 
"Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin (Appeal Judgement)," 2007, p. §247) 
 
 
Shifting Rhetoric – The Bradbury Memos 
Such mounting criticisms and pressures from Congress, Supreme Court and the 
international community led to a clear shift in the Administration’s overall rhetoric. A 
memo written by Steven Bradbury for John Rizzo on 20 July 2007 showed a marked 
shift away from interpretive denial of reinterpreting the meaning of torture (‘what 
we do isn’t torture’) towards what Cohen calls implicatory denial (‘our actions are 
justified under the current circumstances - yes, it was cruel, but it was necessary.’). 
Justifications for certain actions were therefore no longer based on a different 
interpretation or definition of torture, but on the fact that they were necessary due 
to exceptional circumstances. 
 
In the first of two memos, the CIA sought legal clarity/permission for six enhanced 
interrogation techniques.6 The memo set out that since 2001 the CIA had used ‘what 
the President described as an “alternative set of procedures” – and what the 
Executive Branch internally has referred to as “enhanced interrogation techniques”.’ 
(Bradbury, 2007, p. 1) These techniques had been authorised by the Executive and 
executed in a manner they ‘determined to be safe, effective, and lawful.’ (Bradbury, 
2007, p. 1) Bradbury justified the previous use of EIT by arguing that ‘the President 
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has stated that the use of such techniques has saved American lives by revealing 
information about planned terrorist plots.’ (Bradbury, 2007, p. 1)  This line of 
argumentation is different to previous memos in that Bradbury acknowledges that 
actions were cruel, but that they were necessary in the given circumstances. They 
were justified by the President exerting his Commander-in-Chief powers and citing 
necessity and self-defence. 
 
Bradbury argued that the legal landscape had changed considerably, however, since 
the passing of the DTA which prohibits cruel and inhuman treatment of anyone in 
the custody of the US ‘regardless of location and nationality.’ (Bradbury, 2007, p. 2) 
This is an important change as the Executive’s policy used to be limited to US citizens 
or detainees on US territory. Bradbury also referred to previous Supreme Court 
decisions that held (contrary to Bush) that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions applied to the current conflict. ("Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Secretary of 
Defense et al.," 2006) 7  
 
Bradbury concluded that none of the proposed techniques violated the DTA or the 
War Crimes Act. He argued that to reach the high legal threshold of cruel and 
inhuman treatment, the conduct in question must be considered to ‘shock the 
conscience’. This test ‘requires a balancing of interests that leads to a more flexible 
standard than the inquiry into coercion and voluntariness … and the governmental 
interests at stake may vary with the context.’ (Bradbury, 2007, p. 30) The suggested 
techniques were therefore evaluated within their context and were also justified 
with a lesser evil argument – weighing up security interests against the need to 
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protect human rights. Bradbury found that the proposed CIA techniques were 
justified within the context of the interest to protect the US from terrorist attacks.8  
 
On 15 January 2009, Steven Bradbury wrote a second memo in which he distanced 
the OLC from certain opinions and propositions that were made by the OLC in the 
aftermath of 9/11. Again in line with an implicatory denial reasoning, he justified any 
potential wrongful conduct with reference to the ‘extraordinary’ circumstances. 
The opinions addressed herein were issued in the wake of the atrocities of 
9/11, when policy makers, fearing that additional catastrophic terrorist 
attacks were imminent, strived to employ all lawful means to protect the 
Nation. In the months following 9/11, attorneys in the Office of the Legal 
Counsel and the Intelligence Community confronted novel and complex legal 
questions in a time of great danger and under extraordinary time pressure.” 
(Bradbury, 2009, p. 1) 
 
He clarified that certain propositions related to the allocation of authorities between 
the President and Congress in matters of war and national security did not reflect 
current views of the OLC. He also moved away from the idea that the President had 
absolute powers by arguing that ‘the President, like all officers of the Government, is 
not above the law.’ (Bradbury, 2009, p. 3) Furthermore, he wrote that ‘the prior 
opinion of this Office suggesting that Congress has no role to play concerning the 
prosecution of enemy combatants is incorrect.’ (Bradbury, 2009, p. 5) 
 
This shows that previous attempts to change the meaning of the anti-torture norm 
were not accepted even within sections of the US government acting at the time. 
Bradbury clearly tried to distance the OLC from a number of contested opinions, 
rationalising them as actions done under extraordinary circumstances and a time of 
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great danger. Engaging in ‘implicatory denial’, he admitted that even though some 
actions were wrong, they could be rationalised in the given context. As Cohen 
argues, ‘a strong form of contextualization is to assert that the particular 
circumstances in which the country finds itself are so special that normal standards 
of judgment cannot apply.’ (1996, p. 532)  
 
It is important to note that it has become clear in recent years that torture and 
prisoner abuse took place systematically, rather than by a few ‘rogue’ individuals. 
These actions were ‘the product of a systematic policy of expressed in explicit 
instructions to the interrogators of the US Armed Forces and the CIA to obtain 
“actionable intelligence”.’ (Heine, 2011, p. 573) An inquiry by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in December 2008 found that  
the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot be simply attributed to the 
actions of “a few bad apples” acting on their own. The fact is that senior 
officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use 
aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of legality, 
and authorized their use against detainees. (Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 2008, p. xii) 
 
This finding was further supported by the 2014 Report on the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Programme that was issued by the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.  
 
The post-Bush era – Obama and the 2014 Torture Report 
A few days after taking office, on 22 January 2009, incoming President Barrack 
Obama issued an Executive Order that revoked Bush’s July 2007 Order, announcing 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied and that all interrogations 
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of individuals in custody of the US have to comply with the CAT and other relevant 
laws. He further stated that detainees should not be subjected to any treatment that 
was not part of the Army Field Manual. Obama reversed the Bush administration’s 
policy on torture which makes it clear that the US challenge to the norm was a 
temporary, rather than a long-term, ongoing strategy. Controversially, however, 
Obama also announced that no one would be prosecuted for their role in the alleged 
torture of detainees. He argued that ‘this is a time for reflection, not retribution’ 
(The White House, 2009) and that those who carried out the interrogations acted in 
good faith based on legal advice from the Justice Department. This is controversial as 
there have been numerous calls for establishing at least an independent commission 
to investigate the role of individuals in giving legal advice authorising torture 
practices.9  
 
On 29 July 2009, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) found that Bybee 
and Yoo committed professional misconduct when violating their ‘duty to exercise 
independent legal judgment and render thorough, objective, and candid legal 
advice.’ (Office of Professional Responsibility, 2009a, p. 11) This verdict was further 
toned down by the Associate Deputy Attorney General who argued that Bybee and 
Yoo ‘exercised poor judgment by overstating the certainty of their conclusions and 
underexposing countervailing arguments.’ (Margolis, 2010, p. 68) As the OPR report 
had set out, ‘poor judgment differs from professional misconduct in that an attorney 
may act inappropriately and thus exhibit poor judgment even though he or she may 
have not violated or acted in reckless disregard of a clear obligation or standard.’ 
(Office of Professional Responsibility, 2009b, p. 19) Both these assessments failed to 
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deal with the real problem of the issue, however: they did not consider the legality 
of the conduct that was authorised by the memos but solely focussed on the manner 
Yoo and Bybee arrived at their assessments. As Cole argues, this was ‘almost 
certainly because doing so would have implicated not only John Yoo and Jay Bybee, 
but all of the lawyers who approved these methods over the five-year course of their 
application.’ (Cole, 2010) 
 
It has become increasingly difficult to defend inaction in light of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence’s 2014 Torture Report that highlights a number of failings 
from different CIA as well as government officials with regard to their detention and 
interrogation programme.10 Because as Alvarez rightly points out: “when 
government lawyers torture the rule of law as gravely as they have done here, 
international as well as national crimes may have been committed, including by the 
lawyers themselves.” (Alvarez, 2005-2006, p. 223) The Senate Report set out that 
one of its key findings was that the CIA provided inaccurate information to the 
Department of Justice, thereby impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA’s 
Detention and Interrogation programme. Even though the Report argues that the 
OLC had been misled about the effectiveness of the techniques, this is 
inconsequential to the legal advice that was given as this was based on assessing the 
legality of different actions and not their possible outcomes (i.e. their effectiveness). 
The CIA might have exaggerated the ‘necessity claim’ but that had no direct bearing 
on the way international law was used to assess different techniques by government 
lawyers.   
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Furthermore, the Report’s assertion that the administration was misled has been 
challenged by a number of sources including Bush and Cheney who maintain that 
they have always been fully briefed about CIA interrogation techniques. Referring to 
the Report, Cheney said: “I think that’s all a bunch of hooey. The program was 
authorized. The agency did not want to proceed without authorization, and it was 
also reviewed legally by the Justice Department before they undertook the 
program.” (Baker, 2014) Similarly, former and current CIA Directors issued joint a 
statement, maintaining that their programme saved lives: “The president approved 
the program. The attorney general deemed it legal. The CIA went to the attorney 
general for legal rulings four times--and the agency stopped the program twice to 
ensure that the Justice Department still saw it as consistent with U.S. policy, law and 
our treaty obligations. The CIA sought guidance and reaffirmation of the program 
from senior administration policy makers at least four times. We relied on their 
policy and legal judgments. We deceived no one.” (Tenet et al., 2014) 
 
Conclusions 
The debates surrounding the anti-torture norm are important for a number of 
reasons. They show how a very fundamental human rights norm was challenged by 
the US and how international law was used as justification for certain policy 
decisions and actions. It was not an open and direct challenge to the CAT’s validity, 
but an instance of norm contestation which needs to be seen within its context. But 
even throughout the whole period of norm contestation, the US continued to claim 
that it was at the forefront of human rights while at the same time challenging one 
of its fundamental norms. In its argumentation, the Bush administration justified the 
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use of torture in terms of an extraordinary and unprecedented threat to the 
American way of life that could only be dealt with by approving harsher 
interrogation methods. This does not mean the demise of the anti-torture norm 
because the US did not question or deny the existence of the norm and international 
laws themselves – it much rather tried to reinterpret established rules. Much rather 
than showing the demise of the norm, the discussions surrounding the anti-torture 
norm reaffirmed the absolute prohibition of torture and clarified its application.  It 
can be argued that “perhaps ironically, instead of further undermining the weak 
shared understanding supporting the prohibition of torture that existed in 2001, 
events over the years from 2005 to 2009 have ultimately reinforced that shared 
understanding, potentially making the anti-torture rule stronger.” (Brunnée & 
Toope, 2010, p. 250)  
 
The debates and memos also show, however, the importance of international law as 
a reference frame for policy decisions as it was not simply cast aside, but all actions 
were justified with reference to existing international legal obligations. The anti-
torture norm is established in international law that has been ratified on the national 
level in US law but its actual implementation proved to be dependent on the 
interpretation of context. The ‘extraordinary’ crisis situation of the ‘War on Terror’ 
led to an instance of norm contestation whereby norm implementation (i.e. ratified 
in national law) conflicted with norm compliance (i.e. actual policy decisions and 
practice).  
 
As Brunnee and Toope rightly argue  
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the US government for a time became an active ‘norm entrepreneur’ in 
seeking to alter two distinct aspects of the international prohibition on 
torture: first, that torture was outlawed in all circumstances (leading figures 
in the administration argued that the president retained absolute discretion 
to use all means necessary to protect US citizens from terrorism); and 
second, that torture could be defined to allow waterboarding and other 
techniques that did not produce pain equivalent to the spasms of death or 
‘organ failure’. (Brunnée & Toope, 2010, pp. 249-250) 
 
 They failed, however to generate shared understandings necessary for normative 
change. This was partly due to the legality of norms advanced in the memos and also 
popular opinion against the ‘whatever it takes’ approach to combat terrorism.  
 
Contra McKeown (McKeown, 2009) who argues that the anti-torture norm might be 
in the way towards regression, this paper concludes that even though the Bush 
administration attempted to undermine and ‘regress’ the established norm, it was 
not successful in the longer term. The administration faced domestic as well as 
international opposition to its policies and it had to change its rhetoric following 
public pressure after the memos were leaked. There was very little public support 
for the administration’s broad interpretation of torture and Obama reversed all of 
the policies related to torture that were advanced by his predecessor. The anti-
torture norm was challenged, but a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ of the norm on the 
international level has not materialised. As Brunnee and Toope argue, even though 
the norm is rhetorically strong and practically weak, it is also in a period of normative 
transition. They argue that “the reassertion of a robust shared understanding that 
the prohibition of torture is necessary, and that it should be absolute, is building.”  
(2010, p. 269) This clearly shows the circle of the influence practice and norm 
contestation have on the norm itself: norm contestation and the challenge to the 
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anti-torture norm’s validity lead to new shared understanding and thereby a further 
shaping of the law. 
 
A reassessment of the practice of the anti-torture norm during the Bush 
administration is also evident in the reactions to new revelations related to the 
programme and also the 2014 Torture Report. On 1 August 2014, Obama admitted 
that some of the EITs amounted to torture. He said that “in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 we did some things that were wrong.  We did a whole lot of things that were 
right, but we tortured some folks.  We did some things that were contrary to our 
values.” And further: “And when we engaged in some of these enhanced 
interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe and I think any fair-minded 
person would believe were torture, we crossed a line.  And that needs to be -- that 
needs to be understood and accepted.  And we have to, as a country, take 
responsibility for that so that, hopefully, we don't do it again in the future.” (House, 
2014) There are calls for clearer standards to close any possible loopholes11 which 
shows that practice and cultural validation can lead to new shared understandings 




Adamson, F. B., & Sriram, C. L. (2010). Perspectives on international law in 
international relations. In B. Cali (Ed.), International Law for International 
Relations (pp. 25-45). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Alvarez, J. E. (2005-2006). Torturing the Law. Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law, 37, 175-223.  
Arbour, L. (2005). Human Rights Day - Statement by UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Louise Arbour. New York: United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights. 
Baker, P. (2014, 8 December 2014). Dismissing Senate Report, Cheney Defends C.I.A. 
Interrogations, New York Times.  
Bradbury, S. G. (2007). Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting Counsel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee 
Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 
Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al 
Qaeda Detainees.  Washington D.C.: Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General. 
Bradbury, S. G. (2009). Memorandum for the Files: Status of Certain OLC Opinions 
Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Washington D.C.: Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 
Brunnée, J., & Toope, S. J. (2010). Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brunnée, J., & Toope, S. J. (2011). Interactional international law: an introduction. 
International Theory, 3(2), 307-318.  
Bush, G. W. (2004). Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of 
Victims of Torture. Government Printing Office Retrieved from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-06-30/html/WCPD-2003-06-30-
Pg824.htm. 
Bush, G. W. (2005). President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department 
of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes 
in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006". In T. W. House 
(Ed.). Washington. 
Bybee, J. S. (2002a). Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President: 
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A.  
Washington D.C.: Office of the Assistant Attorney General. 
Bybee, J. S. (2002b). Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting Counsel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative.  Washington D.C.: 
Office of the Assistant Attorney General. 
Civil liberties: Just a few bad apples? (2005, 20 January 2005). The Economist. 
Cohen, S. (1996). Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, 
and Counterclaims. Human Rights Quarterly, 18(3), 517-543.  
Cole, D. (2010). They Did Authorize Torture, But... The New York Review of Books, 
April, 42.  
Committee, S. A. S. (2008). Inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. 
Congressional Record: October 5, S. (2005). Department of Defense Appropriations 




Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. International Organization, 52(4), 887-917.  
Goldsmith, J. L., & Posner, E. A. (2006). The Limits of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gonzales, A. R. (2002). Decision re application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners 
of war to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense et al.  (Supreme Court of the United States 
2006). 
Heine, J. (2011). Politics as Usual? US Torture Practices 2001–2008 and Transitional 
Justice. In D. Forsythe (Ed.), Forum: Transitional Justice: The Quest for Theory 
to Inform Policy (Vol. 13, pp. 570-578): International Studies Review. 
Henderson, C. W. (2010). Understanding International Law. Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
House, T. W. (2009). Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of OLC 
Memos.  Washington D.C. 
House, T. W. (2014). Press Conference by the President. 
Ignatieff, M. (2002). Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism. Social Research, 
69(4), 1137-1158.  
Johns, F. (2005). Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception. The 
European Journal of International Law, 16(4), 613-635.  
Levin, D. (2004). Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General: Re: 
Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A.  Washington D.C.: 
Office of the Assistant Attorney General. 
Liese, A. (2009). Exceptional Necessity: How Liberal Democracies Contest the 
Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment when Countering Terrorism. Journal 
of International Law and International Relations, 5(1), 17-47.  
Margolis, D. (2010). Memorandum for the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney 
General.  Washington D.C.: Office of the Deputy Attorney General. 
Mayer, J. (2005, 14 February 2005). Annals of Justice: Outsourcing Torture. New 
Yorker. 
McKeown, R. (2009). Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the 
Torture Norm. International Relations, 23(1), 5-25.  
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin (Appeal Judgement), No. IT-99-36-A  (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2007). 
Responsibility, D. o. J. O. o. P. (2009a). Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's 
Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists. 
Responsibility, D. o. J. O. o. P. (2009b). Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's 
Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists. 
Sands, P. (2008). Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law. 
London: Allen Lane. 
Scherer, M., & Ghosh, B. (2009, 31 August). McCain Denies Giving O.K. to a CIA 




Statement of FBI Agent Ali Soufan at Torture Hearing,  (2009). 
Tenet, G. J., Goss, P. J., Hayden, M. V., McLaughlin, J. E., Calland, A. M., & Kappes, S. 
R. (2014, 9 December). Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations Saved Lives, Wall 
Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-
interrogations-saved-lives-1418142644 
Waldron, J. (2005). Torture and Positive Law: Jurisiprudence for the White House. 
Columbia Law Review, 105(6), 1681-1750.  
Wiener, A. (2008). The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and 
International Encounters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wiener, A. (2009). Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms in 
international relations. Review of International Studies, 35(1), 175-193.  
Wiener, A., & Puetter, U. (2009). The Quality of Norms is What Actors Make of It: 
Critical Constructivist Research on Norms. Journal of International Law and 
International Relations, 5(1), 1-16.  
Yoo, J. C. (2003). Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense 
Re: Military Interrogation for Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United 
States.  Washington D.C. 
Zelikow, P. D. (2006). The McCain Amendment and U.S. Obligations under Article 16 
of the Convention Against Torture.  Washington D.C. 
Zelikow, P. D. (2009). The OLC "torture memos": thoughts from a dissenter.   
 
                                                 
1See for instance (See for example: Goldsmith & Posner, 2006and )  and (Adamson & Sriram, 2010).  
2Other decisions to the same effect include: House of Lords – A (FC) and others v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, 2005 (at 33-34); Supreme Court of Canada - Suresh v. Canada, 2002 (at 62-
64); UN Torture Committee, 23 November 2003 (at 1 & 5); and ICTY – Furundzija, 1998 (at 154)  
3For a detailed account of the involvement of high ranking members of the Bush administration in 
authorising torture and their subsequent attempts to cover their tracks, see (Sands, 2008) 
4There is a long standing debate over what kind of powers the President has in wartimes under the US 
Constitution. War powers are divided between the legislative and the executive branches of the US 
government. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the powers to declare war. Article 
II, Section 2 gives the President the power to direct troops as Commander-in-Chief. Some argue that 
this provisions gives the President unchecked powers, but others counter that there are limits to 
these powers. They argue that presidential power in wartime is essentially based on ‘civilian 
supremacy’ over the military rather than giving additional powers in times of emergency.   
5This reminds of Richard Nixon’s famous quote: ‘When the President does it that means it’s not 
illegal.’ (Interview with David Frost, 6 April 1977) 
6Unlike the 2005 memo that sought permission for ten interrogation methods, these six did not 
include waterboarding.  
7The Military Commission Act (MCA) that followed this Supreme Court decision leaves interpretation 
of Common Article 3 to the President. 
8Bradbury cited several members of Congress as giving their support to this finding. This was disputed 
by John McCain, however, who argued that one of the techniques (sleep deprivation) amounted to a 
form of torture and that he would therefore oppose it. (Scherer & Ghosh, 2009)   
9A number of calls have been made by NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and the Centre for 
Constitutional Rights, to criminally investigate Bush and other senior officials (including Cheney and 
Rumsfeld) for their role in authorising torture, but Obama remains firm that no such investigation will 
be held.  
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10Overall, it is interesting to note that the Torture Report focusses mainly on criticising the CIA for 
using torture because it was ineffective as a tool to gather intelligence rather than because it torture 
is illegal.   
11At the time of writing, Senator Dianne Feinstein is planning to propose a series of recommendations 
to prevent the future use of torture by the government.   
